[Criticism of Hegelian dialectics and philosophy at all]
The preoccupation with the content of the old world, the development of modern German criticism, which was caused by the material, was so violent that a completely uncritical attitude to the method of criticizing and a complete unconsciousness over the seemingly formal but really essential question took place now with the Hegelian dialectic ? The unconsciousness – about the relation of modern criticism to Hegelian philosophy in general and to dialectics in particular – was so great that critics like Strauss and Bruno Bauer the former is complete, the second in his “Synoptic” (where he places the “self-consciousness” of abstract man in the place of the substance of “abstract nature”) and even in discovered Christianity, at least potency, within it Hegelian logic. So it is z. B. in Discovered Christianity :
“As if self-consciousness, by setting the world apart, and making the difference in what it produces, does not bring itself out of itself, since it only removes the difference of what has been produced by itself, since it is produced only in [1 *] and in Of the movement itself – as if it did not have its purpose in this movement “etc. or:” You “(the French materialists)” have not yet been able to see that the movement of the universe is really only for itself as the movement of self-consciousness and united to unity with her. ” 
Expressions that do not even show in language a difference from the Hegelian conception, but repeat it literally.
|| XII | How little was there any consciousness of the relation to Hegelian dialectics during the act of criticism (Bauer, the “Synoptic”), how little this consciousness arose after the act of material criticism, Bauer proves when he is free in his good cause – <569> standardize the cheeky question the Lord’s group “what now with the logic”, thereby rejecting that he refers him to future critics.
But even now, after Feuerbach – both in his “Theses” in the Anecdotes as well as in detail in the philosophy of the future – the old dialectics and philosophy has overturned the germ, after, on the other hand, the criticism that this act did not know how to accomplish The act accomplished, as pure, decided, absolute, proclaimed itself with clear criticism, after it in their spiritualistic arrogance, the whole historical movement on the relationship of the rest of the world – which falls before her under the category of the “mass” – to you reduce yourself and all dogmatic opposites in one dogmatic opposition of their own wisdom and the stupidity of the world, the critical Christ and humanity, as the ” heap “, having dissolved their own excellence every day and hour by the mindlessness of the masses, having at last the critical judgment of the day announced under the guise that the day approaching, where all decaying humanity will rally against her, probed by her in groups, and every one particular heap will receive his testimony pauperism, after having her sublimity over human sentiments, as over the world on which, enthroned in sublime solitude, only from time to time makes the laughter of the Olympic gods sound from their sarcastic lips, he has printed – after all these delightful gestures of the idealism (of youthfulness) which differs under the form of criticism, he also has He did not even suspect that he was critical of his mother, the Hegelian dialectic, and that he himself was not able to give any critical relation to Feuerbach’s dialectic.A completely uncritical behavior to oneself.
Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious , critical relationship to Hegelian dialectics and has made true discoveries in this field, is the true conqueror of ancient philosophy in general. The magnitude of the performance and the noiseless simplicity with which F [euerbach] gives it to the world stand in a whimsical contrast to the inverse relationship.
Feuerbach’s great act is:
1. the proof that philosophy is nothing other than the religion put into thought and thought; another form and mode of alienation of the human being; that is also to be condemned;
<570> second the foundation of true materialism and of real science , in that Feuerbach also makes the social relation of “man to man” the fundamental principle of theory;
3. By confronting the negation of negation, which claims to be the absolutely positive, with the positivity resting on oneself and positively based on oneself.
Feuerbach explains the Hegelian dialectic – (and thus substantiates the outcome of the positive, the sensuous conscience) as follows:
Hegel starts from the alienation (logical: the infinite, abstract general) of the substance, the absolute and fixed abstraction. In other words, it is based on religion and theology.
Secondly , he picks up the infinite, sets the real, the sensual, the real, the finite, the special (philosophy, the abolition of religion and theology).
Thirdly , he removes the positive, restores the abstraction, the infinite. Restoration of religion and theology.
Thus Feuerbach conceives of the negation of negation only as a contradiction of philosophy with himself, as the philosophy which affirms theology (transcendence, etc.), after denying it, thus affirms it in opposition to itself.
The position or self-affirmation and self-affirmation, which lies in the negation of the negation, becomes for one not yet sure of itself, and therefore subject to its contradiction, self-doubting and therefore in need of proof, thus not proving itself by its existence not admitted || XIII | Position and therefore directly and unexpectedly opposed the sensually certain, self-founded position. [A]
But by conceiving of the negation of negation-of the positive relation which lies within it-as the truly and only positive, the negative relation which lies within it, as the only true act and self-actuation act of all being, Hegel has found only the abstract, logical, speculative expression for the movement of history, the not yet real history of man as a presupposed subject, but first the act of generation, the genesis of man. We shall explain both the abstract form and the difference that this movement has in Hegel, as opposed to modern criticism, to the same process in Feuerbach’s essence of Christianity , or rather the critical figure of this movement, which is still uncritical in Hegel. – A look at the Hegelian system. One must begin with Hegelian phenomenology , the true birthplace and the secret of Hegelian philosophy. –
A. The self-confidence.
I. Consciousness . a) Sensual certainty or this and the meaning of mine . b) The perception or the thing with its characteristics and the deception . g) Power and intellect, appearance and super-sensible world.
II. Self-confidence . The truth of the certainty of oneself. A) Independence and dependence of self-consciousness, domination and bondage. b) Freedom of self-consciousness. Stoicism, skepticism, unhappy consciousness.
III. Reason . Certainty and truth of reason. a) observing reason; Observation of nature and self-consciousness. b) Realization of reasonable self-consciousness by oneself. Lust and necessity. The law of the heart and the madness of the own dark. The virtue and the world run. c) The individuality, which in and of itself is real. The spiritual animal kingdom and the fraud or the thing itself. The legislative reason. The law-checking reason.
B. The spirit .
I. The true spirit; the morality. II. The alienated mind, the education. III. Of himself certain spirit, morality.
C. The religion. Natural, art religion, manifest religion.
D. The absolute knowledge .
Just as Hegel’s Encyclopedia begins with logic, with pure speculative thought , and with absolute knowledge , the self-conscious, self-grasping philosophical or absolute, ie superhuman, abstract spirit, the whole “encyclopaedia” is nothing but the expanded nature the philosophical mind, its self-objectification; how the philosophical mind is nothing but the alienated spirit of the world, thinking within its self-alienation, that is, comprehending itself abstractly. – The logic – the money of the mind, the speculative, the thought valueof man and nature – her against all real certainty completely indifferent gewordnes and therefore unreal beings – that emptied , thus abstracting from nature and the <572> real human thinking ; the abstract thinking. – The externality of this abstract thinking … nature , as it is for this abstract thinking. It is external to him, his self-loss; and it also conceives it outwardly, as abstract thought, but as abstracted abstract thinking – finally the mindThis thought returning to its own place of birth, which as an anthropological, phenomenological, psychological, moral, art-religious spirit, still does not hold for itself until finally it finds itself as absolute knowledge and therefore absolute, ie abstract, spirit, and self-affirming. receives its conscious and corresponding existence. For his real existence is abstraction . –
A double mistake with Hegel.
[The] 1. appears most clearly in phenomenology as the birthplace of Hegelian philosophy. If, for example, he grasps wealth, state power, etc., as a being alienated from the human being, this only happens in his thought-form… They are thought-beings – hence merely an alienation of pure , ie, abstract philosophical thought. The whole movement ends therefore with the absolute knowledge. What these objects are alienated from and to whom they confront the presumption of reality is abstract thought. The philosopher lays himself – that is, even an abstract figure of alienated man – as the standard of the alienated world. The whole History of alienation and the total withdrawal of the alienation is therefore nothing but the production history of the abstract, i.e absolute || XVII | [2 *] thinking, of logical speculative thinking. The alienation , which therefore constitutes the real interest of this alienation and abolition of this alienation, is the antithesis of itself and of itself , of consciousness and self-consciousness , of object and subject i.e, the antithesis of abstract thought and of sensuous reality or of real sensuality within the thought itself. All other opposites and movements of these opposites are now the semblance , the cover , the esoteric form of these only interesting opposites, which is the meaning of the other profane G Form [statements of account]. It is not that the human being humorously , in contrast to itself, objectifies itself , but that, in distinction from and in contrast to abstract thinking, it objectifies itself is regarded as the posited and the abolished essence of alienation.
<573> || XVIII | The appropriation of the essential forces of man, which have become objects and foreign objects, is thus, first, an appropriation which proceeds in consciousness , in pure thought , that is, in abstraction , the appropriation of these objects as thoughts and movements of thought , which is why in phenomenology- in spite of its thoroughly negative and critical outlook, and despite the critique that is actually contained in it, which often anticipates late developments – even the uncritical positivism and equally uncritical idealism of the later Hegelian works – this philosophical dissolution and restoration of existing empiricism – lies latent. as germ, as potency, as a mystery. Secondly . The Understanding of the objective world for humans – eg the realization that the sensory consciousness is not an abstract sensory consciousness, but a humanly sensible consciousness, that religion, wealth etc., only the alienated reality of the human Objectification , the human essential forces born of the work and therefore the way to the true human reality – this appropriation or the insight into this process appears in Hegel so that the sensibility, religion , state power etc. are spiritual beings – because only the Spirit is the true essence of man, and the true form of mind is the thinking mind, the logical, speculative mind. The humanity of nature and nature, the products of man, produced by history, appears in the fact that they are products of the abstract mind, and so are mental moments, thought-beings . The Phenomenology is therefore the verborgne themselves still unclear and mysteriousness criticism; but insofar as they retain the alienation of man-though man appears only in the form of the spirit- all elements of criticism are hidden in him , and often already prepared and elaborated in a manner far superior to Hegel’s standpoint . The “unhappy consciousness”, the “honest consciousness”, the struggle of “noble and wicked consciousness”, etc., etc., these individual sections contain the critical ones Elements – but still in an estranged form – of entire spheres, such as religion, the state, of civil life, etc. So what the essence , the object , then the as thought-being subject always consciousness or self-consciousness , or rather the object appears as abstract consciousness, man now as self-consciousness , the differentiated forms of estrangement that appear, are therefore only different forms of consciousness and self-consciousness. As in itself the abstract consciousness – for which the object becomes conceived – is merely a distinguishing factor of self-consciousness – so also, as a result of the movement, does the identity of self-consciousness with consciousness, absolute knowledge, no longer appear outwardly, but now the movement of abstract thought, which proceeds in itself as a result, ie, the dialectic of pure thought is the result [3 *] . | XVIII ||
|| XXIII | [4 *]  The great thing about Hegelian phenomenology and its end result – the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle – is thus that Hegel grasps the self-generation of man as a process, the objectification as objectification, as alienation and as a repeal of this alienation; that he grasps the essence of labor and comprehends the objective man, true, because he is the real man, as a result of his own work . The real, activeMan’s behavior as a species being or the activity of his as a real species being, ie, as a human being, is now possible because he really is capable of all of his generic powers , which is again only possible through the total effect of human beings, only as a result of history. which is first and foremost possible again in the form of estrangement.
The one-sidedness and the limit of Hegel will now be discussed in detail in the final chapter of Phenomenology – “Absolute Knowledge” – a chapter which covers both the combined spirit of phenomenology, its relation to speculative dialectics, and Hegel’s consciousness of both and their reciprocal relationship contains – represent.
For the time being we only anticipate that: Hegel is on the stand of modern economists. He grasps labor as the essence , as the self-sustaining essence of man; He now sees the positive side of the work, not its negative side. The work is the assurance of the human being within the alienation or as an exterminated person. The work that Hegel alone knows and acknowledges is the abstract spiritual . So what forms the essence of philosophy in general , the alienation of the knowing man or the thinking-minded personScience, it detects Hegel as its essence, and it can therefore summarize and his philosophy as the previous philosophy towards their individual moments thatconstitute philosophy. What the other philosophers did-that they conceive of individual moments of nature and of human life as moments of self-consciousness, namely of abstract self-consciousness- Hegel knows as the doing of philosophy. That’s why his science is absolute.
Let us now move on to our subject.
“The absolute knowledge”. Last chapter of phenomenology .
The main thing is that the object of consciousness is nothing but self-consciousness, or that the object is only objectified self-consciousness , self-consciousness as object. (Setting man = self-confidence.)
It is therefore necessary to overcome the object of consciousness . The objectivity as such applies to an estranged relation of man, which does not correspond to the human being , to the self-consciousness. The reappropriation of the objective essence of man, created as alien, under the designation of alienation, does not now have the meaning of abolishing alienation , but of objectivity , ie, man is regarded as a non-objective, spiritualistic being.
Hegel now describes the movement of overcoming the object of consciousness as follows:
The object is not only revealed (this is, according to Hegel, the one-sided – that is, the one-sided understanding of that movement) as returning to the self . Man is set = self. The self, however, is now the abstractly conceived human being created by abstraction. Man is selfish. His eye, his ear etc. is selfish ; every one of his essential powers has in him the quality of selfhood . But that is why it is quite wrong to say that self-consciousness has an eye, an ear, an essential force. The self-confidenceis rather a quality of human nature, of the human eye, etc., not human nature is a quality of || XXIV | Self-confidence .
The abstracted and fixed self is the human being as an abstract egoist , who in his pure abstraction raises egoism to thinking . (We’ll come back to this later.)
The human being , the human being , applies to Hegel = self-consciousness . All alienation of the human being is therefore nothing but estrangement of self-consciousness . The estrangement of self-consciousness is not considered an expression , an expression of the real alienation of the human being that mirrors knowledge and thought . The real , which appear to be real alienation rather, their innermost verborgnen – <576> and only matched by the philosophy to light – essentially nothing but the appearance of the estrangement of the real human being, theSelf-confidence . The science that understands this is called phenomenology . All reappropriation of the alienated objective being therefore appears as an incorporation into self-consciousness; the human being who takes possession of his essence is only the self-consciousness taking possession of the objective beings. The return of the object to the self is therefore the reappropriation of the object.
Expressed in all things , the overcoming of the object of consciousness is :
1. that the object as such presents itself to consciousness as vanishing;
2. That it is the alienation of self-consciousness which sets the thinghood;
3. That this alienation is not now negative , but positive ;
4. Do not have it for us or for yourself, but for yourself .5. For it the negative of the object or its self-self-abolition has thereby the positive meaning, or it knows this invalidity of it by giving itself away, for in this alienation it isposited as an object or the object around the inseparable one Unity of being- for- self sake as itself.
6. On the other hand, there is at the same time another aspect of this moment, that it has likewise lifted and taken back into itself this alienation and objectivity, that is, in its otherness as such .
7. This is the movement of consciousness, and that is why the totality of its moments.
8. It must also behave as the object according to the totality of its determinations, and so have grasped it after each of them. This totality of its determinations makes it in itself a spiritual being, and for the consciousness this becomes in truth by the apprehension of each one of them as the self or by the just mentioned mental behavior towards them. 
1. That the object as such presents itself to consciousness as vanishing is the above-mentioned return of the object to the self .
ad 2. The abandonment of self-consciousness sets the thinghood . Because man = self-consciousness, so is his externalized objective being or thingness (that which is an object for him , and object is truly only for him, which is an essential object to him, that is, his objective being the real man , so not even the nature – man is the human nature – is rendered as such the subject, but only the abstraction of man, self-consciousness, so thinghood can now be the alienated self-consciousness) = the alienated self-consciousness, and the thinghood is set by this alienation. That a living, natural being endowed and endowed with objective, ie, material, essential forces also has both real natural objects of its essence, and that its self- evacuation constitutes the setting of a real , but not of the form of externality , that is, of its essence, and overpowering, objective world is natural. There is nothing incomprehensible and enigmatic about it. Rather, the opposite would be puzzling. But that self-consciousness through its renunciation now becomes the thingness, That even now an abstract thing, a thing of abstraction and not a real can put thing is equally clear. It is || XXVI |  also clear that thingness is therefore absolutely nothing independent, essential to the self-confidence, but a mere creature, a product which he posited , instead of confirming itself, and the laws, is now a confirmation of the act of putting the fixed his energy as the product for a moment and apparently gave him the role-but for a moment-of an independent, real being.
When the real, bodily, standing on the solid well-rounded earth off all natural forces and inhaling man his real, objective essential powers through its alienation as foreign objects is so is not the set subject; [A *] It is the subjectivity of representational essential forces, whose action must therefore be objective . The objective being acts objectively, and it would not be objective if the objective were not in its essence. It creates, now sets objects, because it is set by objects, because it is inherently natureis. In the act of setting, therefore, it does not fall out of its “pure activity” into a creation of the object , but its objective product confirms only its objective activity, its activity as the activity of an objective natural being.
We see here how naturalism or humanism is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time is their unifying truth. At the same time we see how only naturalism is capable of grasping the act of world history.
<578> < Man is immediately a nature being . As a being of nature and as a living being of nature, he is partly equipped with natural forces , with vital forces , an activenature being; these forces exist in him as faculties and abilities, as instincts ; in part, as a natural, bodily, sensuous, objective being, he is a suffering , conditioned and limited being, just as the animal and the plant are, ie the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him ; but these objects are objects of hisNeed , for the operation and confirmation of its essential forces indispensable, essential objects . That man is a physical , natural, living, real, sensuous, objective being means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being, his life’s expression, or that he can now express his life in real, sensuous objects . Being objective, natural, sensuous , and having both object, nature, sense, or self-object, nature, meaning for a third is identical.> Hunger is a natural need ; he therefore needs a naturebesides himself, an object out of itself, to satisfy itself, to breastfeed. Hunger is the established need of my body for an object that is outside of it and indispensable for its integration and expression . The sun is the object of the plant, an object indispensable to it, confirming its life, as the plant is the object of the sun, as an expression of the life-giving power of the sun, of the representational force of the sun.
A being, which does not have its nature beyond itself, is not a natural being, does not participate in the nature of nature. A being that has no object beyond itself is not an objective being. A being, which is not itself the object of a third being, has no essence as its object , that is, does not behave objectively, its being is not objective.
|| XXVII | An inoffensive being is a mischief .
Set a being that is neither an object nor an object. First of all, such a being would be the only being, there was no being outside of it, it existed lonely and alone. For as soon as there are objects outside of me, as soon as I am not alone , I am another , another reality, than the object outside me. For this third object, therefore, I am a different reality than he, that is, his object. A being that is not the subject of another. Being is, therefore, assumes that no objective being exists. As soon as I have an object, this object is my object. But onenon-figurative essence is an unreal, non- sensuous, now-conceived, ie, now conceited, being, a being of abstraction. To be sensuous , that is to say, to be real, is to be the object of meaning, to be a sensual object, that is to say, to have sensory objects beside oneself, that objects have their sensuality. To be sensual is to be suffering .
Man, therefore, as an objective sensuous being, is a suffering and, because he feels his suffering, a passionate being. The passion, the passion is the essential force of man, which strives energetically for his object.
But man is not only a natural being, but he is a human nature being; that is to say, for itself being, that is to say, the species being , as which it must confirm and operate both in its being and in its knowledge. Neither are the human objects are not natural objects as they exist immediately, nor is the human mind , as it immediately is , is representational, human sensibility, human objectivity. Neither nature – objectively – nor nature subjectively is directly present to the human being adequately.> And just as all natural things must arise , so does the human beingMan his act of creation, the story , but for him a known act of creation, and therefore as an act of creation with consciousness is abolishing creation act. History is the true natural history of man. – (That’s back.)
Third, because this positing of the thinghood itself is now an illusion, an act contradicting the nature of the pure activity, it must also be suspended, the thingness denied.
ad 3, 4, 5, 6. – 3. This alienation of consciousness has not now negative , but also positive meaning and 4. this positive meaning not now for us or in itself, but for it, the consciousness itself. for it the negative of the object or its self-self-canceling thereby having the positive or meaning, it knows this nullity of the same in that it is emptied himself, for at this alienation know it as the subject or object to the inseparable unity of the for-itselfon the other hand, there is at the same time the other factor, that it has likewise abrogated and withdrawn within itself this alienation and objectivity, and thus is with it in its otherness as such .
We have already seen. The appropriation of estranged objective being or the abolition of objectivity under the determination of alienation – which has to go away from the indifferent strangeness to the <580> real hostile estrangement – has for Hegel at the same time or even mainly the importance of objectivity annulled because not certaincharacter of the object, but its objective character for the self-consciousness is the offensive and the alienation. The object is therefore a negative, a self-abolishing, a nullity. This voidness of consciousness does not have a negative, but a positive, aspect for the consciousnessMeaning, because that voidness of the object is precisely the self-affirmation of the non-objectivity, the || XXVIII | Abstraction , itself. For the consciousness itself , the nullity of the object has a positive meaning in that it knows this nothingness, the objective being, as its self-renunciation ; that it knows that it is only through its self-emptying …
The way consciousness is, and what it is for, is knowledge . Knowledge is its only act. Something therefore becomes the same, insofar as it knows something . Knowledge is his only objective behavior. Now it knows the nothingness of the object, that is, the non-difference of the object from it, the non-existence of the object for it, in that it knows the object as its self- renunciation, that is, knowledge as an object knows that the object is now the illusion of an object, a pre-made haze, is by its very nature nothing else than the knowledge itself, which opposes itself and therefore is a nothingnesshas opposed something that has no objectivity but knowledge; or knowledge knows that by behaving as an object, it is now out of itself; that it itself now appears as an object , or that what appears to it as an object is now itself.
On the other hand, says Hegel, lies at the same time this other moment, that it has just as much lifted and taken back into itself this alienation and objectivity, that is, in its otherness as such .
In this dispute we have all the illusions of speculation together.
For one thing: Consciousness, self-consciousness is in itself in its otherness as such . It is therefore – or if we abstract here from the Hegelian abstraction and set the self-consciousness of man instead of the self-consciousness – it is in itself as such in its otherness . In it lies the fact that consciousness-knowledge as knowledge-thought as thinking-is directly the other of itself, purporting to be sensuality, reality, life-the thought that offers itself in thinking. (Feuerbach.  ) This page is contained here, insofar as consciousness as consciousness is not concerned with alienated objectivity, but with objectivity as such has his kick.
Secondly, the self-conscious man, insofar as he has recognized and abolished the spiritual world-or the universal spiritual existence of his world-as self-renunciation, nevertheless confirms it again in this alienated form and gives it out as his true existence, restores it. in his ] *] [5 otherness being as such claims to be, that after the abolition of religion, for example, after the recognition of religion as a product of self-alienation, but in religion as religion is confirmed. Here is the root of Hegel’s falsepositivism or its now apparent oneCriticism: what Feuerbach refers to as setting, negating and restoring religion or theology – which is more general. So reason is with itself in the unreasonableness as unreasonableness. The human being, who has recognized in law, politics, etc., to lead an empty life, leads his true human life in this dispossessed life as such [6 *] . Self-affirmation, self-affirmation in contradiction to oneself, both with knowledge and with the essence of the object, is thus the true knowledge and life .
Hegel’s accommodation against religion, state, etc., can therefore no longer be a question, since this lie is the lie of his principle.
|| XXIX | If I religion as alienated human self-consciousness do so, I know in her confirmed as religion is not my self-consciousness, but my alienated self-consciousness in him. I do not know my own self-consciousness, which belongs to its essence, in religion , but rather in the annihilated, aborted religion.
In Hegel, therefore, the negation of negation is not the affirmation of the true essence, precisely through the negation of the illusory, but the confirmation of the illusory or the alienated being in its denial, or the negation of this illusory being as an objective, dwelling on and by man independent nature and its transformation into the subject.
A peculiar role, therefore, is played by the uplifting , in which the denial and the preservation, the affirmation, are linked.
For example, in Hegel’s philosophy of right, the abolished private law = morality , the abolished morality = family , the abrogated family = bourgeois society , the abolished bourgeois society = state , the abolished state world history . In reality , private law, morality, family, bourgeois society, state etc. remain, only they have become moments, the existences and modes of existence of man, which do not apply in isolation, mutually dissolve and generate, etc., moments of movement .
In its real existence, this is hidden from its mobile nature. It first comes to light in revelation, in philosophy, and that is why my true religious existence is my religious-philosophical existence, my true political existence is my legal-philosophical existence, my true natural existence is the natural-philosophical existence, my true artistic existence is the art-philosophical existence. my true human existence my philosophical existence . Likewise, the true existence of religion, state, nature, art is the religious, natural, political, and political philosophy, But if only the philosophy of religion etc. is to me the true existence of religion, then I am truly religious only as a religious philosopher , and so I deny the true religiosity and the truly religious man. But at the same time I confirm it, partly within my own existence or within the strange existence which I oppose to them, for this is only their philosophical expression; partly in their peculiar original form, for they are considered to me to be only apparent otherness, allegories, forms of their own true identity hidden beneath sensual draperies, id est my philosophical Existence.
Likewise, the superseded quality = quantity , superseded Quantity = measure , which superseded dimension = essence , the superseded beings = appearance , superseded phenomenon = reality , superseded reality = term , the concept superseded = objectivity , superseded objectivity = absolute idea , the abolished absolute idea = nature , the abolished nature = subjective spirit, the abolished subjective spirit = moral objective spirit, the abolished moral spirit = art, the abolished art = religion , the abolished religion = absolute knowledge .
On the one hand, this lifting is a lifting of the imaginary being, so the imaginary private property is raised in the thought of morality. And because thought imagines itself to be directly the other of itself, sensuous reality , that is to say, its action is also valid for sensible real action, so does this thinking uplift, which has its object in reality, truly overcome it, and on the other hand because he has now become to him a moment of thought, therefore he also applies to him in his reality as a self-affirmation of himself, of self-consciousness, of abstraction.
|| XXX | On the one hand, the existence which Hegel abolishes in philosophy is therefore not the actual religion, state, nature, but religion itself as an object of knowledge, dogmatics , so jurisprudence, political science, natural science . On the one hand, then, he stands in opposition both to the real being and to the immediate unphilosophical science or to the unphilosophical concepts of this essence. He therefore contradicts their practicable concepts.
On the other hand, the religious etc. man can find his last confirmation in Hegel.
It is now the positive moments of Hegelian dialectics – within the determination of alienation – to grasp.
a) The lifting , as representational, the withdrawal ingesting movement. This is the insight, expressed within alienation, of the appropriation of the objective being through the abolition of its alienation, the alienated insight into the actual objectification of man, into the actual appropriation of his objective nature through the annihilation of the alienatedDetermination of the objective world, through its abolition, in its alienated existence, as atheism is the abolition of God’s becoming of theoretical humanism, communism as the abolition of private property is the indication of real human life as its property, the turning point of practical humanism. or atheism is the humanism mediated by the abolition of religion, communism the self-mediated by the abolition of private property. It is only through the abolition of this mediation – which, however, is a necessary prerequisite – that the positive humanism , which begins positively in itself, becomes positive .
But atheism, communism, are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the objective world created by man, his essential powers born of objectivity, no poverty returning to unnatural, undeveloped simplicity. On the contrary, they are only the actual becoming, the actual realization of one’s being and one’s essence as real for man.
Hegel, therefore, grasps the positive meaning of the self-referential negation – albeit again in an alienated way – the self-alienation, essence-evocation, objectification, and realization of man as self-gaining, being-expression, objectification, realization. (In short, he conceives – within abstraction – work as man’s self-generation act , his behavior as a foreign being, and the actuation of his being as a foreign being as the consciousness of the species and the species . “
b) In Hegel – or rather as a consequence of the already described wrongness – this act appears once as a purely formal , because as an abstract, because the human being itself is considered only as an abstract thinking being , as self-consciousness; and
secondly, because the version is formal and abstract , therefore, the removal of alienation becomes confirmation of alienation, or for Hegel, that movement of self-expression , of self-objectification as self-emptying and self-estrangement, is the absolute, and therefore the ultimate, self-endowing, and in itself perturbed, by their nature arrived human life expression .
This movement in its abstract || XXXI | Form as a dialectic is therefore considered to be truly human life , and because it is an abstraction, an alienation of human life, it is considered a divine process , but as the divine process of man – a process that distinguishes his abstract, pure, pure nature undergoes absolute being itself.
Third, this process must have a carrier, a subject; but the subject becomes first as a result; this result, the subject who knows himself as an absolute self-consciousness, is therefore the God, absolute Spirit, the knowing and operating idea . Real man and real nature merely become predicates, symbols of this obscure unreal man and this unreal nature. Subject and predicate, therefore, have the relation of an absolute inversion to one another, a mystical subject-object or subjectivity that transcends the object , the absolute subject as a process , as an alienating oneand from the self-emptying in itself returning, but at the same time in back participating subject and the subject as this process; the pure, restless circle in itself.
Once. Formal and abstract version of man’s self-creation or self-objectification act.
The alienated object, the alienated essential reality of man is – as Hegel sets man = self-consciousness – nothing but consciousness, now the thought of alienation, its abstract and therefore contentless and unreal expression, the negation . The abolition of alienation, therefore, is nothing but an abstract, contentless abolition of that insensible abstraction, the negation of negation . The content-filled, living, sensual, concrete activity of self-objectification therefore becomes its mere abstraction, the absolute negativity, an abstraction that is again fixed as such and conceived as an independent activity, as the activity par excellence. Because this so-called negativity is nothing else than the abstract, contentless form of that actual living act, therefore, content can be merely a formal content produced by the abstraction of all content. There are, therefore, the general, abstract, belonging to each content, it also indifferent to both all content, just as it valid for any content abstraction forms , the forms of thought, the logical categories torn from real mind and from real nature. (We become the logical one Develop content of absolute negativity below.)
The positive thing that Hegel has accomplished here – in his speculative logic – is that the definite concepts , [B *], are the general fixed forms of thoughtTheir independence from nature and mind is a necessary result of the general alienation of the human being, and therefore of human thought as well, and that Hegel therefore represented and summarized them as moments of the process of abstraction. For example, the abrogated being is essence, the abrogated essence of the concept, the abrogated concept … absolute idea. But what is the absolute idea? It rescues itself if it does not again go through the whole act of abstraction and content itself with being a totality of abstractions or the abstract abstraction. But the abstract abstraction knows itself as nothing; she has to give herself up, the abstraction, and so she arrives at a being, which is exactly the opposite of nature, The whole logic, then, is the proof that abstract thought is nothing in itself, that the absolute idea is nothing in itself, that only nature issomething.
|| XXXII | The absolute idea, the abstract idea, which
“following its unity with itself considered viewing is” (Hegel Encyclopedia , 3rd edition, p.222 [§ 244]) which ( lc ) “in the absolute truth of itself decides that moment their specificity or the first determining and being different , the immediate idea , as its reflection, as a natural free to dismiss off “( lc )
this whole, so strange and barbarous idea, which has caused tremendous headaches to the Hegelians, is nothing at all unlike abstraction , ie, the abstract thinker, who, by experience, is astute and enlightened about its truth; wrong, and even abstract – decides conditions, to give up and their difference, the particular, specific to the place of their Beisichseins, not being [7 *] , and put them generality them indeterminacy that nature , they now considered as an abstraction, Thought-hidden within itself, to release itself freely , ie to leave the abstraction and once free from itTo look at nature. The abstract idea, which will immediately look on, is nothing else than the abstract thought, which gives itself up and decides to intuition . All this transition from logic to natural philosophy is nothing else than the transition from abstraction to contemplation, so difficult to accomplish for the abstract thinker and therefore so adventurously described by him . The mystical feeling, which drives the philosopher from abstract thinking into contemplation, is the boredom , the longing for a content.
(The self-alienated man is also to his essence , that is, to the natural and human beings of alienated thinkers.) His thoughts are therefore fixed spirits, as well as nature and man Hegel has locked in his logic all these fixed spirits, each one of them as negation that is, as an alienation of human thought, then as negation of negation, that is, as an abrogation of this alienation, as realStatement of human thought; but since – as even in the alienation – this negation is partly the restoration of the negation in its alienation, partly the standing still in the last act, the self-reference in the alienation, as the true existence of these fixed spirits [B] , partly insofar as this abstraction grasps itself and feels itself to be infinitely bored, Hegel abandons the abandonment of abstract thinking, now moving in thought, which is without an eye, without a tooth, without an ear, without everything as a resolution to recognize nature as being and to shift to intuition.)
|| XXXIII | But even nature , taken abstractly, for itself, fixed in the separation from man, is nothing to man . It goes without saying that abstract thought, which has decided to look at it, looks at it abstractly. Just as nature, thought, was enclosed in its self-confounding and enigmatic form, as an absolute idea, as a thought-thing, so it has in Truth, by liberating it from itself, only this abstract nature -but now with the meaning that it is the otherness of thought, that it is the real nature viewed, distinguished from abstract thinking-now the thought-thingreleased from nature. Or, to speak a human language, in its view of nature abstract thought finds out that the beings which it does in the divine dialectic as pure products of self-weaving and nowhere in reality-looking work of thinking out of nothing, out of the to create pure abstraction means nothing other than abstractions of natural determinations . All nature repeats the logical abstractions only in a sensual, external form. – He analyzes them and these abstractions again. His view of nature is thus the confirmation act of his abstraction from the view of nature [8 *]who consciously repeated the process of procreation of his abstraction. So z. Eg the time = negativity, which refers to itself (p.238 lc ). Being raised up as being corresponds in its natural form – the suspended movement as matter. The light is – the natural form – the reflection in itself . The body as moon and comet is – the natural form – of opposition , which according to logic is, on the one hand, the positive resting on itself and, on the other hand, the negative resting on itself . The earth is the natural form of the logical reasonas a negative unity of opposition etc.
The nature as nature , that is, insofar as it sensual yet different from that secret, verborgnen in his mind the nature separately distinguished from these abstractions is nothing , one as bewährendes Stern , is meaningless or now has the sense of an externality that must be lifted.
In the finite- teleological point of view there is the void premise that nature does not contain the absolute purpose in itself. ” p.225 [§ 245].
Its purpose is the confirmation of abstraction.
“Nature has emerged as the idea in the form of otherness , since the idea is as the negative of itself or outwardly , so nature is not external, only relative to this idea, but the externality makes the determination, in which she is as nature. ” p. 227 [§ 247].
The externality here is not to be understood as the sensuality expressed and the light, the sensual man . The externality is here in the sense of the alienation, of a lack, of an infirmity, which should not be to take. For the true is still the idea. Nature is only the form of her otherness . And since abstract thought is essence , that which is external to it is in essence only external . At the same time, the abstract thinker recognizes that sensuality is the essence of nature, externality in contrast to that in itselfweaving thinking. But at the same time he expresses this antithesis in such a way that this externality of nature is its antithesis to thought, its defect that, insofar as it differs from abstraction, it is a defective being. || XXXIV | A being that is not inadequate for me, in my opinion a defect in itself, has something outside it which it lacks. Ie its essence is one else but yourself. Nature must therefore even cancel for abstract thinking, because they heard of him as a the power of reversed is set beings.
” For us, the mind has nature as its presupposition , whose truth, and therefore its absolute first , is it: in this truth nature has disappeared , and the spirit has emerged as the idea attained to its being-being, its object as well as the subject the term is. this identity is absolute negativity , because in nature the concept has its perfect external objectivity, but that his alienation lifted, and he is become in this identical with itself it is this identity therefore now than coming back from the nature. . ” p.392 [§ 381].
“The revelation which, as the abstract idea, is the immediate transition, the becoming of nature, is the manifestation of the spirit that is free, the setting of nature as itsworld, a setting which, as a reflection, is the presupposition of the world as an independent nature Revealing the concept of creation is the same as his being, in which he gives himself the affirmation and truth of his freedom. ” “The Absolute is the Spirit : this is the highest definition of the Absolute.” [p.393, § 384.] | XXXIV ||